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Corporations are ordinarily recognized as legal entities separate and
distinct both from their own shareholders, officers, and directors, and
from other corporations.' There are, however, situations in which the
Washington courts will not recognize this separateness. In such cases, the
shareholders, officers, directors, or even wholly separate corporations,
are held responsible for the corporation's activities. When they have re-
fused to recognize the corporation as a separate legal entity, Washing-
ton's courts have employed the "doctrine of disregard."
2
The consequences of the doctrine are not borne by the corporation. Fre-
quently, its underlying liability has already been established. In other
cases, the corporation's own responsibility is not an issue. In all cases,
the doctrine's remedial power is directed against the shareholders, offi-
cers, directors, or other corporations that are "alter egos" of the corpora-
tion.3
The doctrine of disregard has been most often considered with respect
to close corporations, parent-subsidiary corporations, and brother-sister
* Shareholder, Merrick, Hofstedt & Lindsey, P.S., Seattle, Washington; A.B., 1970, Harvard
College; J.D., 1973, Cornell University.
1. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 548, 552-53,599 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1979).
2. Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 353, 366-67, 588 P.2d 1334,
1343 (1979). The courts have also referred to the doctrine as "piercing the corporate veil." Frigidaire
Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400, 404, 562 P.2d 244, 247 (1977). Both concepts
are used interchangeably to accomplish the same result. See, e.g., Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92
Wn. 2d 548, 553, 599 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1979); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc. 88
Wn. 2d at 404-05, 562 P.2d at 247; J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64 Wn. 2d 470, 475, 392 P.2d
215, 218-19 (1964); State v. Davies, 176 Wash. 100, 113-14, 28 P.2d 322, 327 (1934). In Morgan
v. Burks, 22 Wn. App. 768, 770 n. 1, 592 P.2d 658, 659 n. 1 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 93 Wn.
2d 580, 611 P.2d 751 (1980), the court of appeals indicated that the generic term "disregarding the
corporate entity" is more appropriate. Washington Supreme Court Justice Charles Horowitz adopted
the "disregard" terminology in his article Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations, 14
WASH. L. REV. 285 (1939), 15 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1940).
The corporation and other entities whose separate existences are not recognized are often called
"alter egos." E.g., Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d at 553, 599 P.2d at 1273; Garvin v.
Matthews, 193 Wash. 152, 156, 74 P.2d 990, 992 (1938).
3. The doctrine of disregard should not be confused with concepts relating to successor corpora-
tions or with the principle that corporate shareholders, officers, and directors are individually liable
for their own wrongful acts. Successor corporations may be held liable for the obligations owed by
predecessor corporations. Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 353, 366,
588 P.2d 1334, 1343 (1979). Officers, directors, and other agents of a corporation, moreover, are
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corporations. A close corporation is a corporation whose stock is held by
a small number of shareholders. One-man, family, and professional cor-
porations are all close corporations. In a parent-subsidiary relationship,
the parent corporation is the controlling shareholder of the subsidiary cor-
poration's stock. Brother-sister 4 corporations are two corporations both of
which are controlled by the same nucleus of shareholders. Brother-sister
corporations do not own controlling shares of each other's stock.
The applicability of the doctrine of disregard is not limited to those
three relationships. The doctrine can be applied in any situation where the
corporate form has been abused. In an appropriate case, Washington's
courts will refuse to recognize even the largest publicly-held corporation
as being separate from its shareholders, officers, directors, or other enti-
ties that have abused it.
Under any circumstances, the resolution of issues involving the doc-
trine is a complex process. The inner workings and ramifications of the
doctrine can be fully appreciated only after one analyzes the circum-
stances in which the doctrine will be applied, its jurisprudential history,
the equitable nature of the doctrine, doctrinal distinctions among different
types of corporations, and the manner in which issues involving the doc-
trine are litigated and reviewed.
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of disregard can be invoked in many different factual con-
texts. Most of those situations involve one or more of the following five
functional concerns: providing a remedy, creating a new substantive lia-
bility, creating a right or benefit in favor of shareholders, promoting con-
venience, and constituting or allowing assertion of a defense.
A. Providing a Remedy
It is where there is an underlying claim against the corporation that the
personally liable for their own wrongful acts. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 548. 553.
599 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1979). Invocation of either of these legal principles may lead to the same
result. Conceptually, however, they should be distinguished from the doctrine of disregard.
4. The "brother-sister" terminology appears in H. HENN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 248 (1974). Washington's courts have never adopted Henn's anthropomorphic lan-
guage, or any other terminology, to describe this relationship. It might be more appropriate to clas-
sify such entities as "affiliated" corporations. Unfortunately, the terminology "'affiliated" has been
used to refer indistinguishably to both "parent-subsidiary" and "brother-sister" corporations. See R.
STEVENS & H. HENN, STATUTES, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 375 (1965).
In the one Washington case using the terminology "affiliated," that term referred to a parent-subsidi-




Washington's Doctrine of Disregard
doctrine is most often considered. The doctrine has also been invoked in
criminal actions so as to allow wider enforcement of a criminal law. 5 In
practice, the legitimacy of the underlying claim is often litigated in the
same action.
6
The doctrine allows fuller satisfaction of the underlying right when the
corporation lacks sufficient assets to completely discharge its obliga-
tions. 7 The separate existence of a corporation, however, will not be dis-
regarded solely because its assets are not sufficient to meet its obliga-
tions. 8 As the Washington courts have recognized, a corporation's
shareholders can legitimately seek to limit their liability. 9
B. Creating a New Substantive Liability
The doctrine of disregard may be invoked even though there is no un-
derlying claim or issue involving the corporation. In such cases, applica-
tion of the doctrine creates a new liability against each shareholder or
other entity whose separate existence is not recognized. It is in contract
cases where the doctrine is commonly invoked in this fashion. Character-
izing the corporation and other entities as "alter egos" can substantially
affect the breadth of contractual duties. 10
5. State v. Davies, 176 Wash. 100, 28 P.2d 322 (1934).
6. E.g., Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 26 P.2d 92 (1933); Peterick v.
State, 22 Wn. App. 163,589 P.2d 250 (1977).
7. The following are cases in which the doctrine of disregard has been evaluated in a remedial
sense: Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 611 P.2d 751 (1980); Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92
Wn. 2d 548, 599 P.2d 1271 (1979); Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d
353, 588 P.2d 1334 (1979); Frigidaire Sales Corp- v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400, 562
P.2d 244 (1977); Critzer v. Oban, 52 Wn. 2d 446, 326 P.2d 53 (1958); Deno v. Standard Furniture
Co., 190 Wash. 1, 66 P.2d 1158 (1937); Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 26
P.2d 92 (1933); Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 P. 633 (1924); Peterick v. State, 22 Wn.
App. 163,589 P.2d 250 (1977).
8. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 582, 611 P.2d 751, 754 (1980); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v.
Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400, 406,562 P.2d 244, 247 (1977).
9. Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 353, 366, 588 P.2d 1334,
1343 (1979); Bums v. Norwesco Marine, Inc., 13 Wn. App. 414, 418, 535 P.2d 860, 862-63
(1975).
10. See Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wn. 2d 169, 205 P.2d
597 (1949); State ex rel. Tacoma v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 61 Wash. 507, 112 P. 506 (1911). In
Tacoma Ry. & Power, Puget Sound Electric Railway owned two separate rail transportation compa-
nies (hereinafter referred to as the "railway company" and the "transfer company"). The railway
company entered into a contract with the City of Tacoma. By asserting the doctrine of disregard, the
city sought to bind the transfer company, as well as the railway company, to the terms of the contract.
The trial courtinvoked the doctrine and awarded a writ of mandamus compelling the transfer com-
pany to perform the obligations set out in the city-railway company contract. The supreme court
reversed the granting of the writ, but only because the activities of the railway company and the
transfer company did not justify the trial court's application of the doctrine. If the circumstances had
justified application of the doctrine, the scope of the contract would have been substantially ex-
panded.
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Plaintiffs have also sought to fashion new substantive liabilities by in-
voking the doctrine in replevin and insurance rehabilitation proceed-
ings.ll Application of the doctrine may even create new substantive
rights for third parties without necessarily creating a liability against ei-
ther the corporation or its shareholders. 
12
C. Creating a Right or Benefit in Favor of Shareholders
In Garvin v. Matthews, 13 the Washington Supreme Court formulated
the general rule that only third persons can invoke the doctrine of disre-
gard.14 That rule has been followed in two tax cases in which corpora-
tions themselves requested the court to apply the doctrine. In one case'
5
the defendent parent corporation sold management services to its subsidi-
ary. The other case 16 involved the selling of goods by the defendant sub-
sidiary corporation to its parent. In both cases, the defendant corporation
contended that the separate existence of the purchasing corporation
should be disregarded so that the transaction would not be characterized
as a "sale" subject to business and occupation taxes. The court refused to
invoke the doctrine for the benefit of the corporations that had, for their
own business reasons, treated themselves as formally separate entities. 
17
Despite the limitation set out in Garvin v. Matthews, the Washington
courts have, on at least one occasion, allowed a shareholder to benefit
from the application of the doctrine. 18 In resolving the probate proceeding
I1. Kueckelhan v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., 69 Wn. 2d 392, 418 P.2d 443 (1966) (insurance
rehabilitation); Sweet v. Lease, 154 Wash. 25, 280 P. 742(1929) (replevin).
12. See Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Daniels, 15 Wn. 2d 393, 130 P.2d 892 (1942). In this
case, Eba's Inc. ("Eba") executed an assignment for the benefit of creditors to Seattle Association of
Credit Men ("SACM"). SACM sought to recover, as a preference, a payment made by Eba to defen-
dants Daniels and Turnquist for their repair of a store front. The trial court applied the rule that a
payment made by an insolvent (Eba) to discharge a lien against its property did not constitute a
preference and dismissed SACM's action.
The supreme court reversed after determining that Daniels and Turnquist did not have an enforce-
able lien against Eba. Technically, Eba was not the lessee in possession of the property. The defen-
dants alleged that the actual lessee-Dutch Maid Foods-and Eba were one and the same corpora-
tion, that their separate identity should be disregarded, that the lien was enforceable, and that, as a
result, the payment was not a preference.
The supreme court held that the facts in the case did not justify application of the doctrine. Had the
Eba-Dutch Maid Foods relationship called for the application of the doctrine, the court would have
recognized Daniels and Tumquist's entitlement without affixing a corresponding liability against
Eba, the disregarded corporation. See also notes 23-25 and accompanying text infra.
13. 193Wash. 152, 74 P.2d 990 (1938).
14. Id. at 157, 74 P.2d at 992.
15. Rena-Ware Distrib., Inc. v. State, 77 Wn. 2d 514,463 P.2d 622 (1970).
16. Washington Sav-Mor Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 58 Wn. 2d 518, 364 P.2d 440 (1961).
17. Rena-Ware Distrib., Inc. v. State, 77 Wn. 2d 514, 518, 463 P.2d 622, 625 (1970); Washing-
ton Sav-Mor Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 58 Wn. 2d 518,523, 364 P.2d 440,443 (1961).
18. In re Estate ofTrierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314 (1971).
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in In re Estate of Trierweiler, 19 the court invoked the doctrine to create an
equitable lien in favor of a shareholder of the disregarded corporation.
The doctrine was invoked even though creation of the equitable lien was
at the expense of third parties. 20
D. Promoting Convenience
When third-party interests have not been involved, the Washington
courts have invoked the doctrine both as a convenience and to avoid cir-
cuitous litigation. 21 The courts will also routinely disregard the corporate
entity when distributing property in a dissolution action.
22
E. Constituting or Allowing Assertion of a Defense
The doctrine can be applied to protect a party's right to assert an affir-
mative defense to a claim. 23 In J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark,24 the
19. Id. Roy Trierweiler died intestate. He was survived by his third wife and by the two children
of his first marriage. All of the decedent's assets were his separate property. R.C.W. § 11.04.020
entitled Mrs. Trierweiler to only one-third of the separate real property and one-half of the separate
personal property. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.04.020 (1974). Ordinarily, the balance of the decedent's
property would be shared equally by the decedent's two children. Id.
The trial court, nevertheless, awarded the entirety of the decedent's property to Mrs. Trierweiler.
Its ruling was based upon an "equitable lien" arising out of both (1) investments made by Mrs.
Trierweiler that preserved her husband's separate estate, and (2) the use of her separate funds to
support the marital community. Much of Mrs. Trierweiler's assets were, in fact, contributed to the
Trierweilers' yam business. The children alleged that an unprofitable corporation formed by the de-
cedent owned the yam business and that the wife's contributions were made to the corporation and
not to the decedent.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that the corporation should be disre-
garded. The court held that the deceased "treated the business as his own." 5 Wn. App. at 21,486
P.2d at 317. Mrs. Trierweiler's contributions to the corporation were treated as assets contributed to
her husband. She was permitted to assert the doctrine even though she was a major shareholder in the
corporation, was active in the yam business, and the children were not chargeable with any wrongdo-
ing. The court employed the doctrine in order to protect the wife's legitimate interests. She had been
the sole manager of the yam business during most of her marriage to the decedent. Unlike the de-
cedent's children, Mrs. Trierweiler financially supported and cared for the decedent during a long and
severe illness.
20. 5 Wn. App. at 21, 486 P.2d at 317.
21. In Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wn. App. 52, 63-64, 480 P.2d 247, 254 (1971), the court disre-
garded the corporate entity so as to avoid a subsequent receivership proceeding. See also Morgan v.
Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 589, 611 P.2d 751,756 (1980); note 69 infra.
22. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 49 Wn. 2d 203, 298 P.2d 1107 (1956); Clark v. Schwaegler, 104
Wash. 12, 175 P. 300 (1913).
23. J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64 Wn. 2d 470, 392 P.2d 215 (1964); H.E. Briggs & Co. v.
Harper Clay Prods. Co., 150 Wash. 235, 272 P. 962 (1928); Keane v. Watson Co., 149 Wash. 424,
271 P. 73 (1928); Seattle International Corp. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 24 Wn. App. 108,600
P.2d 612 (1979).
24. 64Wn. 2d470, 392 P.2d215 (1964).
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plaintiff credit corporation sought to foreclose a chattel mortgage origi-
nally held by its wholly-owned manufacturing company. The court al-
lowed the defendant to assert the same defenses against the credit com-
pany that it could have raised against the manufacturing company. The
court disregarded the separate corporate existence of the credit company
and held that it would not be allowed the rights of a holder in due
course. 25
III. THE DECISION TO DISREGARD
A. General Criteria
The Washington Supreme Court has indicated that both of the follow-
ing elements must be proved before the corporate entity will be disre-
garded:
1. That there is such a commingling26 of property rights or inter-
ests as to render it apparent that the corporation and some other en-
tity were intended to function as one;
2. That to regard the corporation and the other entity as separate
would aid the consummation of a fraud or wrong upon others. 27
Prior to the recent decision in Morgan v. Burks, 28 there was substantial
confusion as to whether it was necessary to prove one or both of the requi-
site elements before the doctrine would be applied. Earlier, in Pittsburgh
Reflector Co. v. Dwyer & Rhodes Co.,29 the court recognized that it had
not resolved this issue.30 Moreover, in two recent pre-Morgan decisions,
the court had used language consistent with a disjunctive test.31
25. Id. at 478,392 P.2d at 220.
26. In determining whether to disregard the corporate entity, the trial court can consider corpo-
rate behavior occurring both before and/or after the underlying claim has matured. Morgan v. Burks.
93 Wn. 2d 580,585, 611 P.2d 751,754-55 (1980).
27. Id. at 587-88, 611 P.2d at 756-57; J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64 Wn. 2d 470,475. 392
P.2d 215, 218 (1964). See also Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 654, 26 P.2d
92, 98 (1933).
28. 93 Wn. 2d 580,611 P.2d 751 (1980).
29. 173 Wash. 552, 23 P.2d 1114(1933).
30. Id. at 555, 23 P.2d at 1115.
31. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 548, 552-53, 599 P.2d 1271. 1273 (1979):
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400, 405, 562 P.2d 244. 247 (1977).
Since 1940, Justice Charles Horowitz has been Washington's leading scholar on the doctrine of
disregard. In Soderberg Advertising, Inc. v. Kent-Moore Corp., I I Wn. App. 721, 734. 524 P.2d
1355, 1363-64 (1974), Justice Horowitz, then a court of appeals judge, recognized that this confu-
sion had not been resolved in the 41 years that had passed since Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Dwyer &
Rhodes Co., 173 Wash. 552, 23 P.2d 1114 (1933). Although the court of appeals did not expressly
address the issue, its decisions in Morgan v. Burks, 22 Wn. App. 768, 592 P.2d 658 (1979). rev'd,
93 Wn. 2d 580, 611 P.2d 751 (1980) and Peterick v. State, 22 Wn. App. 163, 589 P.2d 250 (1977),
implicitly adopted the approach that only one of the two elements need be proved. Justice Horowitz'
258
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The historical development of the doctrine in Washington supports the
conclusion that both elements must be proved. 32 Requiring both elements
to be proved is not a novel approach. The courts in California, Oregon,
-and Idaho apply the same conjunctive test adopted by the Washington
courts .33
B. A Case-by-Case Approach
The two general criteria offer only the most general guidance to the
trial court. In reality, every case is decided upon its own peculiar facts.
The Washington Supreme Court has emphasized the limited value of doc-
trinal concepts in this area.34 In Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway
Cafe, Inc.,35 the court tersely noted that: "Appellants' case involves a
factual situation where it was appropriate to disregard the corporate en-
tity. .... 2236
court of appeals decision in Soderberg Advertising, 11 Wn. App. at 734, 524 P.2d at 1363-64 im-
plied that he also felt that the test should be a disjunctive one. In fact, Justice Horowitz earlier indi-
cated his preference for such a disjunctive test in his article Disregarding the Entity of Private Corpo-
rations, 15 WASH. L. REv. 1, 17 (1940).
Justice Horowitz wrote the supreme court's majority opinion in Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580,
611 P.2d 751 (1980). In that opinion, he recognized the conjunctive nature of the trial court's de-
liberations. Id. at 587-88,611 P.2d at 756-57.
32. In Morrison v. Blue Star Navig. Co., 26 Wash. 541, 67 P. 244 (1901), perhaps the earliest
case in which a corporation's separate existence was disregarded, the court did not even utilize
"piercing the corporate veil" or "disregard" terminology. In a subsequent case, Platt v. Bradner
Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 P. 633 (1924), the court showed its nascent interest in doctrinal develop-
ment. The following language in that case provided the basis for what has become the first element in
the current two-step test: " [W]hen one corporation so dominates and controls another as to make that
other a simple instrumentality or adjunct to it, the courts will look beyond the legal fiction of distinct
corporate existence, as the interests of justice require. Id. at 579, 230 P. at 635 (emphasis
added).
In First Nat'l Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 374, 262 P. 984, 986 (1928), the court held that
there were tvo elements and that both must be proved if the doctrine were to be applied. This decision
appears to be the first case setting out both elements now recognized by the supreme court. Actually,
the first element established in Platt v. Bradner Co. and the second element recognized in First Nat'l
Bank v. Walton are not wholly distinct. Where Platt v. Bradner Co. expressed the caveat "as justice
requires," the decision in First Nat'lBank v. Walton dropped the caveat and simply indicated that the
corporate entity would be disregarded only where to do otherwise "would work a fraud upon third
persons." Both cases support the proposition that corporate misconduct will support a disregard of
the corporate entity only when it causes harm. The two decisions could be viewed as being inconsis-
tent only if "as justice requires" should be construed as a "punitive" rather than as a "compensa-
tory" concept. Such a construction is not consistent with the compensatory nature of Washington
law. See, e.g., Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wn. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977); Steele v. Johnson, 76 Wn. 2d
750,458 P.2d 889 (1969).
33. Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979); Schlecht v.
Equitable Builders, Inc., 222 Or. 92, 535 P.2d 86 (1975); Automotriz Del Golfo De California v.
Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d I (1957).
34. First Nat'l Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 375-76,262 P. 984, 987 (1928).
35. 91 Wn. 2d 353, 588 P.2d 1334 (1979).
36. Id. at 367, 588 P.2d at 1343 (emphasis added). See also Zander v. Larsen, 41 Wn. 2d 503,
259
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The two general elements are markedly different. The first element re-
quires the court to determine whether the shareholders 37 abused the cor-
porate form. The various Washington cases contain many different al-
leged instances of such corporate misconduct or wrongdoing. 
38
The second element involves both causal and policy-oriented concerns.
511, 250 P.2d 531, 535 (1952); McCurdy v. Spokane Western Power & Traction Co., 174 Wash.
470,497, 24 P.2d 1075, 1083-84 (1933).
37. Cases in which the doctrine of disregard can be asserted may also involve the conduct and
alleged personal liability of officers, directors, and other companies or entities that are not sharehold-
ers in the abused corporation. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
38. The Washington Supreme Court has never compiled a list of forbidden corporate activities.
Although such a compendium would be obiter dictum, it would provide a useful guide for those
concerned with preserving a corporation's integrity.
In Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations, 14 WASH. L. REV., 285, 292-93 (1939),
Justice Horowitz listed some of the corporate activities subsumed within the first element's general
language:
In parent and subsidiary corporation cases, a most important field for invoking the doctrine,
there must be more than mere stockholder control of the entity sought to be disregarded. There
must be what may be best noted as manipulation. Thus, in addition to the usual elements of
common stockholders, directors and officers, the following facts have been relied on: Excessive
financing by the parent of the subsidiary corporation; payment of the subsidiary's expenses and
losses by the parent; use by the parent of the subsidiary's property as his or its own; description
by the parent of the subsidiary as part of its business; the acts of the subsidiary in the interest of
the parent, rather than its own interest; the fact that the subsidiary has no business except for the
parent corporation, and no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation; the fact
that formal legal requirements such as meetings, elections and separate bookkeeping devices are
not observed by the subsidiary.
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
In Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 385, 386, 394-95, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775, 781-82 (1972), the
California Court of Appeals set out a list of factors that could be considered in evaluating the first
element:
Among the possible factors pertinent to the trial court's determination are: Commingling of
funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized
diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than corporate uses; the treatment by an individual
of the assets of the corporation as his own; the failure to obtain authority to issue or subscribe to
stock; the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corpora-
tion; the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records and the confusion of the
records of the separate entities; the identical equitable ownership in the two entities; the identifi-
cation of the equitable owners thereof with the domination and control of the two entities; identi-
fication of the directors and officers of the two entities in the responsible supervision and man-
agement; the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; the absence of corporate assets, and
undercapitalization; the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a
single venture or the business of an individual or another corporation; the concealment and mis-
representation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest or
concealment of personal business activities; the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to
maintain arm's length relationships among related entities; the use of the corporate entity to
procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity; the diversion of assets from
a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the
manipulation of assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and
the liabilities in another; the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by use of
a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions; and the formation and use of a corporation
to transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity. . ..
260
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In considering this second requirement, the court must determine, in each
particular case, if any of the wrongful corporate activities actually harmed
the party seeking relief.39 Corporate misconduct will not itself justify a
disregard of the corporate entity. 40
IV. DISTINCTIONS BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE
SHAREHOLDER
The same general criteria apply to all corporations. Special considera-
tions, however, apply to all three types of corporation-shareholder rela-
tionships to which the doctrine is most often applied.
A. Close Corporations
Close corporations are legal entities whose shares of stock are held by a
small nucleus of shareholders. The supreme court has rejected arguments
that the two general criteria should be applied more stringently to close
corporations. 41
The decision to disregard the corporate entity in the case of a close
corporation does not end the court's inquiry. Application of the doctrine
of disregard is not necessary with respect to shareholders whose individ-
ual wrongdoing created the underlying claim. 42 As for the other share-
holders, however, the court must decide which, if any, of them are to be
held individually liable for the corporation's responsibilities. Washing-
ton's courts have implicitly recognized that shareholders not associated
with corporate misconduct should not be held individually liable either
for the underlying claim against the corporation or for the abusive activity
of the wrongdoing shareholders. 43
Failure to comply with the provisions set out hn the Washington Business Corporation Act, WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 23A.04-.98 (1979), might, in an appropriate case, support a determination that a
corporation has been abused.
39. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580,587-88, 611 P.2d 751,756-57 (1980); Truckweld Equip.
Co. v. Olson, 26 Wn. App. 638,644, _ P.2d , (1980).
40. See cases cited in note 39 supra and see note 83 infra.
41. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 548, 553, 599 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1979). Cf.
Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart, 13 Wn. App. 489, 495, 535 P.2d 137, 142 (1975) (the court
noted at least a statistical trend to disregard the corporate entity more readily in cases involving close
corporations than in those involving publicly-held companies). The use of the corporate form does
not allow persons rendering "professional services" to avoid their individual liabilities to their cli-
ents. WASH. REv. CODE § 18.100.070 (1979).
42. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 548,554, 599 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1979).
43. See id. at 553, 599 P.2d at 1273-74; Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash. 152, 156-57, 74 P.2d
990, 992 (1938); Briggs & Co. v. Harbor Clay Prods. Co., 150 Wash. 235, 238-39, 272 P. 962, 963
(1928); Bums v. Norwesco Marine, Inc., 13 Wn. App. 414, 419-20, 535 P.2d 860, 863-64 (1975).
This freedom of innocent shareholders from liability is recognized both in cases (1) where the
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B. Parent-Subsidiary Corporations
Unlike the situation involving close corporations, there is, of necessity,
only one shareholder where a parent corporation wholly owns the stock of
its subsidiary. Because the doctrine's focal point is the corporation and its
wrongdoing shareholders, the fact that many or few shareholders own the
parent will not be considered! 4 Even if they are personally blameless,
shareholders of the parent corporation will be indirectly sanctioned when
the parent's misuse of a subsidiary has prejudiced an innocent third party.
The effect of the decision to disregard the parent's separate identity will
vary depending on the number of its shareholders.
C. Brother-Sister Corporations
Brother-sister corporations are companies whose shares are owned by a
common nucleus of shareholders. Neither corporation owns a controlling
share of the other corporation's stock. That fact does not necessarily insu-
late the two corporations from the doctrine of disregard. If a nonshare-
holding corporation commingles its assets with another corporation's as-
sets to the detriment of a third party, the Washington courts will treat the
corporations as "alter egos. "45
The lack of a corporation-shareholder relationship does, however, re-
duce the likelihood that either corporation will be held responsible for the
other's activities. As the court recognized in McCurdy v. Spokane West-
ern Power & Traction Co. :46
Neither the traction company nor the valley company dominated or con-
trolled the other. While Mr. Stoolfire may have dominated both, his domi-
nation was exerted upon each as a separate concern. They were at all times
kept separate and distinct, and neither encroached upon the other in its oper-
ation .... 47
underlying tortious or wrongful activity was intrinsically involved with the corporate misconduct
justifying the decision to disregard and (2) where the underlying liability and the corporate miscon-
duct are distinct from one another. An example of the former factual situation is set out in Harrison v.
Puga, 4 Wn. App. 52, 480 P.2d 247 (1971), where the misappropriation of $16,000 from the corpo-
ration was itself the basis for the underlying claim. Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash.
638, 26 P.2d 92 (1933) involved the latter situation. In Sommer, the claim for the negligent starting
of a fire by defendant's driver was wholly unrelated to the alleged corporate irregularities.
44. That the number of shareholders in the parent corporation is irrelevant has been recognized
by negative implication but not by an express holding. See J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64 Wn. 2d
470, 392 P.2d 215 (1964); Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 26 P.2d 92
(1933).
45. Pittsburgh Reflector Co. v. Dwyer & Rhodes Co., Inc., 173 Wash. 552, 554-55, 23 P.2d
1114, 1115 (1933). In that case, the facts did not justify application of the doctrine.
46. 174 Wash. 470,24 P.2d 1075 (1933).
47. Id. at 496-97, 24 P.2d at 1083-84. See also State ex rel. Tacoma v. Tacoma Ry. & Power
Co., 61 Wash. 507, 112 P. 506 (1911).
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It seems far more likely that, in cases involving brother-sister corpora-
tions, the common nucleus of shareholders owning both corporations
would be the target of the doctrine of disregard.
V. THE EQUITABLE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINE
A. In General
In Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad,
48
the United States Supreme Court expressly recognized the equitable na-
ture of the doctrine of disregard:
In such cases, courts of equity, piercing all fictions and disguises, will deal
with the substance of the action and not blindly adhere to the corporate
form. Thus, where equity would preclude the shareholders from maintain-
ing an' action in their own right, the corporation would also be pre-
cluded. . . . It follows that Amoskeag, the principal beneficiary of any
recovery and itself estopped from complaining of petitioners' alleged
wrongs, cannot avoid the command of equity through the guise of proceed-
ing in the name of respondent corporations which it owns and controls. 49
The Washington courts have alluded to the equitable origin of the doc-
trine.50 They have not, however, clearly recognized that the equitable
nature of the doctrine (1) dictates how issues involving the doctrine are
litigated and (2) enlarges the scope of the trial court's remedial powers.
B. The Jury Trial Issue
Equitable matters are not triable by a jury as a matter of right.51 Even if
a jury is empaneled in an equitable proceeding, it serves only as an advi-
sor to the court. 52 Consequently, a civil53 jury cannot serve as the trier of
48. 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
49. Id. at 713 (emphasis added). See also Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 775,781 (1972).
50. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580,588, 611 P.2d 751,757 (1980); Washington Sav-Mor Oil
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 58 Wn. 2d 518, 523, 364 P.2d 440, 443 (1961); Superior Portland Ce-
ment, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wn. 2d 169, 216, 205 P.2d 597, 622 (1949); Truckweld
Equip. Co. v. Olson, 26 Wn. App. 638, 643, - P.2d , (1980); In ie Estate of
Trierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 20, 486 P.2d 314, 317 (1971).
51. Garey v. City of Pasco, 89 Wash. 382, 383, 154 P. 433, 433 (1916). The Washington State
Constitution provides that the right to jury trial shall remain inviolate. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21.
That guarantee, however, applies only to those causes of action that were triable to juries as a matter
of right at the time the constitution was adopted. Garey v. City of Pasco, 89 Wash. at 383, 154 P. at
433. Equitable issues have never been triable by jury as a matter of right. Id.
52. Leitch v. Young, 60 Wash. 446, 448, 111 P. 449, 449-50 (1910). Determinations made by
such an advisory jury have no binding effect upon the court. Rathjens v. Merrill, 38 Wash. 442, 453,
80 P. 754, 757 (1905). The court need not even empanel an advisory jury. Coleman v. Highland
Lumber, Inc., 46 Wn. 2d 549, 551,283 P.2d 123, 124-25 (1955).
53. A criminal defendant's right to a jury trial is guaranteed by both the United States and the
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factual issues involving the doctrine of disregard. The Washington courts
have not consistently recognized this restriction.
The supreme court has specifically addressed the jury trial issue in only
one case involving the doctrine of disregard. 54 In that case, Sommer v.
Yakima Motor Coach Co., 55 the court held that issues involving the doc-
trine must be resolved by the trial judge. 56 In J.I. Case Credit Corp. v.
Stark,57 the trial court empaneled an advisory jury, but granted judgment
notwithstanding its findings.58
Despite the court's ruling in Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., ju-
ries were empaneled as the trier of fact and ultimately resolved issues
involving the doctrine of disregard in several subsequent cases. 59 Juries
also served as the trier of fact in at least two earlier cases.
60
The confusion remains unresolved. In Morgan v. Burks,61 the plaintiff
unsuccessfully sought to have a jury serve as the ultimate trier of fact.
Although the jury trial issue was squarely raised both at trial and on ap-
peal, neither of the two appellate court opinions even noted that the issue
had been argued. 62
C. Fashioning a Remedy
In cases in which the doctrine is applied, the court must determine the
scope of the shareholders' liability. The equitable nature of the doctrine
provides the trial court with substantial discretion in fashioning a remedy
that is just under all the circumstances. 63
When the underlying claim involves money damages, the court must
determine whether the wrongdoing shareholders are liable for the full
amount, or for only a portion of the underlying claim. In making that
Washington State Constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21. See State v.
Davies, 176 Wash. 100, 28 P.2d 322 (1934).
54. Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638, 26 P.2d 92 (1933).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 649, 659, 26 P.2d at 96, 100.
57. 64 Wn. 2d 470, 392 P.2d 215 (1964).
58. Id. at 472-73, 392 P.2d at 217.
59. Allman Hubble Tugboat Co. v. Reliance Dev. Corp., 193 Wash. 234, 235, 74 P.2d 985, 985
(1938); Deno v. Standard Furniture Co., 190 Wash. 1, 10, 66 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1937); Wilson v.
Washington Concrete Pipe Co., 178 Wash. 545,550, 35 P.2d 71,73 (1934).
60. Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 580, 230 P. 633, 635 (1924); Clark v. Schwaegler,
104 Wash. 12, 12-14, 175 P. 300, 300-01 (1918).
61. 22 Wn. App. 768, 592 P.2d 658 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 611 P.2d
751 (1980).
62. Id.
63. Kreger v. Hall, 70 Wn. 2d 1002, 1008, 425 P.2d 638, 642 (1967); Hubbell v. Ward, 40 Wn.
2d 779, 787, 246 P.2d 468, 473 (1952); Rummens v. Guaranty Trust Co., 199 Wash. 337, 346-47,
92 P.2d 228, 232 (1939).
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determination, the court is guided by the following admonition in
McCurdy v. Spokane Western Power & Traction Co.64
The protection of the [plaintiff] would in no event have called for anything
more than the return of the property to its original owner. . . . The ends of
justice would have required nothing more than that.
The doctrine of theoretical merger of identities has been evolved to oper-
ate as a shield and a protection against fraud and injustice; it is not to be
used as a sword or bludgeon to accomplish an injustice. To saddle the major
part of the traction company's indebtedness upon the valley company would
be a perversion of justice in this instance. 65
In some cases, the corporate misconduct has created, or is closely re-
lated to, the underlying claim against the corporation. 66 In those cases,
the shareholders' individual liability will, in all likelihood, be equal to the
underlying claim against the corporation. 67 Although Washington's
courts have expressed concern about litigation expenses arising out of
proscribed corporate conduct, 68 it is unclear whether wrongdoing share-
holders can be assessed additional damages for the reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs incurred in successfully litigating issues involving the doc-
trine of disregard. 
69
64. 174 Wash. 470, 24 P. 2d 1075 (1933).
65. Id. at 497,24 P.2d at 1083-84.
66. Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 353, 357-58, 588 P.2d
1334, 1338 (1979); Bums v. Norwesco Marine, 13 Wn. App. 414, 419-20, 535 P.2d 860, 863-64
(1975); Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wn. App. 52, 58-59, 480 P.2d 247, 252 (1971); Morrison v. Blue Star
Navig. Co., 26 Wash. 541,547, 67 P. 244, 246 (1901).
67. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 584, 611 P.2d 751, 755 (1980); Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wn.
App. 52, 480 P.2d 247 (1971). In Harrison the defendant's personal liability was limited to the
money fraudulently taken. Id. at 61-62,480 P.2d at 254.
68. Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wn. App. 52, 63,480 P.2d 247,254 (1971).
69. There are no reported Washington cases in which such litigation expenses have been
awarded. The supreme court has consistently held that litigation expenses are not ordinarily recover-
able in the absence of a contract, statute, or recognized ground in equity. Seattle School Dist. v.
State, 90 Wn. 2d 476, 540, 585 P.2d 71, 106 (1978). Neither WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.04-.98
(1979) (Washington Business Corporation Act) nor WASH. REv. CODE §§ 1.40.010-.130 (1979)
(Washington Fraudulent Conveyance Act) establishes a right to recover such expenses. As yet, the
court has not expressly recognized an equitable right to recover such expenses.
In Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 589, 611 P.2d 751, 757 (1980), the supreme court rejected
the plaintiffs' claim for bankruptcy fees allegedly resulting from corporate misconduct. While the
court merely held that the attorneys' fees were not proximately related to the shareholders' miscon-
duct, the court avoided the opportunity to expressly recognize that such a recovery could be made in a
proper case. Id.
A litigant claiming such relief should emphasize the court's concern in preventing, and where
necessary, in remedying the effects of "circuitous" litigation. Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wn. App. 52, 63,
480 P.2d 247, 254 (1971). Equity jurisprudence's ad hoc focus on individual justice and rendering
complete relief is consistent with an award of litigation expenses. See text accompanying notes
63-65 supra.
Washington Law Review Vol 56:253, 1981
Other cases involve a vast discrepancy, both qualitatively and quantita-
tively, between the underlying claim against the corporation and the al-
leged corporate misconduct. 70 When shareholders intentionally set up a
sham corporation, they will be held personally liable for all of the corpo-
ration's debts and obligations. 71 Less pervasive forms of financial misap-
propriation or undercapitalization may call for a remedy more closely tai-
lored to the corporate misconduct. 72 Many cases involve a readily
quantifiable misappropriation of corporate assets. 73 In such situations,
there is no valid reason for distinguishing between subsequent misappro-
priations 74 and misconduct "intrinsically involved" 75 with the operation
of the corporation. 76 In both situations, the proper remedy would include
70. E.g., Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 611 P.2d 751 (1980) (tort judgment for personal
injuries suffered in a shooting accident totalled $2,350,000; corporate misconduct consisted of the
subsequent issuance of $126,000 in secured notes without consideration); Allman Hubble Tugboat
Co. v. Reliance Dev. Corp., 193 Wash. 234, 74 P.2d 985 (1938) (judgment on accounts for mer-
chandise sold and services rendered; corporate misconduct was the intentional setting up of a sham
corporation to avoid paying legitimate debts and obligations); Deno v. Standard Furniture Co., 190
Wash. 1,66 P.2d 1158 (1937) (tort judgment for personal injuries suffered in fall; allegations of prior
commingling of assets and interests).
71. Allman Hubble Tugboat Co. v. Reliance Dev. Corp., 193 Wash. 234, 74 P.2d 985 (1938).
Where such deliberate deception has been perpetrated, the court, in all likelihood, will not limit
personal liability to an amount commensurate with proper financial capitalization. Such pervasive
deception negates the very being of the corporation and the corporate fiction will be totally disre-
garded. As the court indicated in Morgan v. Burks, 22 Wn. App. 768, 771-72, 592 P.2d 658,
659-60 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 611 P.2d 751 (1980), such shareholders will
be treated as "de facto partners" fully liable for the obligations of the redefined business entity.
Implicit in the supreme court's rationale in Morgan v. Burks is a concern for deterring corporate
misconduct. In ruling that personal liability is "not necessarily" limited to the amounts actually
misappropriated, the court may create such a deterrent effect. 93 Wn. 2d at 584, 611 P.2d at 755. An
unbending policy of limiting personal liability to the amount of the wrongful act, especially if litiga-
tion costs cannot be recovered, would place the wrongdoer in a no-lose situation.
72. McCurdy v. Spokane Western Power & Traction Co., 174 Wash. 470, 497, 24 P.2d 1075,
1083-84 (1933). See also text accompanying notes 63-65 supra. The entire focus of the doctrine is
that of achieving justice in the particular case before the court. See J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64
Wn. 2d 470, 478, 392 P.2d 215, 220 (1964); Washington Sav-Mor Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 58
Wn. 2d 518, 523, 364 P.2d 440, 443 (1961); Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 49 Wn. 2d 203, 206-08, 298 P.2d
1107, 1110 (1956); Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash. 152, 157, 74 P.2d 990, 992 (1938).
73. E.g., Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 622 P.2d 751 (1980); Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wn. App.
52, 480 P.2d 247 (1971).
74. Misappropriation occurring after a qualitatively distinct underlying claim has matured.
75. The "intrinsically involved" phraseology and the remedial rule pertaining to tortious activity
qualitatively related to corporate misconduct are found in Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 584. 611
P.2d 751, 755 (1980).
76. The harm suffered by the third party and the extent of the shareholders' wrongful conduct are
the same in both cases. The timing of the misconduct and/or a qualitative distinction between the
underlying claim and corporate misconduct are immaterial.
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the restoration of the misappropriated assets77 and the awarding7 8 of liti-
gation costs to the plaintiff.79 The recent decision in Morgan v. Burks
80
recognizes that the trial court has the requisite flexibility to grant such
relief.
81
In some situations, quantitative evaluation of the corporate miscon-
duct 82 justifying83 application of the doctrine will be difficult if not im-
possible. 84 In those situations, the court will have no choice but to hold
the wrongdoing shareholders personally liable for the full amount of the
underlying claim.
85
VI. THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The Washington appellate courts have not developed a comprehensive
approach for the review of cases involving the doctrine of disregard. This
problem is attributable both to" the appellate courts' failure to recognize
77. In Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 588-89, 611 P.2d 751, 757 (1980), the court recog-
nized that the "setting aside" of fraudulent conveyances could, in appropriate cases, be a satisfactory
"alternative" to application of the doctrine of disregard. In fact, such relief (as well as the restora-
tion of assets where the misappropriation has been consummated) can be conceptualized as one of
several remedial tools available in cases involving the doctrine of disregard. See also note 125 infra.
78. As to whether such costs may be awarded, see note 69 supra.
79. Awarding reasonable attorneys' fees and costs makes the plaintiff whole and does not un-
fairly damage the defendant. The plaintiff's proper recovery should not, in these circumstances, be
effectively reduced as a result of litigation costs resulting from shareholder misconduct.
80. 93Wn. 2d580, 611P.2d751 (1980).
81. Id. at 584, 588, 611 P.2d at 755, 757 (1980). But see note 69 and accompanying text supra.
82. Such an analysis will probably not even be undertaken where the corporation itself was inten-
tionally formed for the purpose of defrauding a creditor or a potential class of creditors. See note 71
supra. The shareholders in that situation will be held fully liable for the corporation's obligations.
Only those shareholders chargeable with less pervasive misconduct are likely to be held liable for an
amount less than the underlying claim.
83. Not all misconduct will justify a disregarding of the corporate entity. While the various irre-
gularities listed in note 38 supra can evidence an "intent" to abuse the corporate form, only miscon-
duct actually prejudicing third parties is actionable. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 587, 611 P.2d
751, 756-57 (1980). The failure to keep corporate minutes and records, to conduct regular meetings,
or to keep separate books are nonquantifiable irregularities that in themselves will in all likelihood not
justify application of the doctrine. Truckweld Equip. Co., v. Olson, 26 Wn. App. 638, 644,
P.2d -, - (1980). Only those irregularities adversely affecting the corporation's financial abil-
ity to meet its obligations will justify disregarding the corporate form. As the court recognized in
Truckweld Equip. Co., 26 Wn. App. at 644-45, - P.2d at _: "Typically, the injustice which
dictates a piercing of the corporate veil is one involving fraud, misrepresentation, or some form of
manipulation of the corporation to the stockholder's benefit and the creditor's detriment. Morgan v.
Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 611 P.2d 751 (1980)." (Citation to Pacific Reporter added).
84. The-failure to keep proper corporate records may prevent the court from ascertaining the full
extent to which corporate funds have been commingled or otherwise misappropriated. Quantification
is also difficult where undercapitalization is alleged. Determining that the corporation's working cap-
ital is insufficient may be far easier than ascertaining the exact capitalization that should have been
established.
85. Such a determination is clearly within the trial court's discretion. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn.
2d 580, 584, 611 P.2d 751, 755 (1980).
Washington Law Review Vol 56:253, 1981
that such claims must be tried to the court86 and to their general disincli-
nation to distinguish meaningfully between findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. 87
The two basic rules governing the review of cases tried to the court 8
8
are well-established. Findings of fact will not be disturbed when they are
supported by substantial evidence. 89 Conclusions of law 90 are freely and
fully reviewable by the appellate courts. 91 With respect to these two is-
sues, the scope of review in cases involving the doctrine of disregard and
other equitable matters is the same as in law cases. 92
Unfortunately, delineating the scope of review in non-jury cases is not
86. See notes 51-62 and accompanying text supra.
87. Civil Rule 52(a)(1) requires the trial court to set out its findings of fact and then state sepa-
rately its conclusions of law:
RULE 52. DECISIONS, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
(a) Requirements.
(1) Generally. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury. the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law. Judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58 and may be entered at the same time as the entry of the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law.
WASH. Civ. R. 52(a)(1).
Rule 52 does not, however, set out a substantive test for distinguishing between findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
88. In this respect, cases tried without a jury and those tried after an advisory jury has been
empaneled are indistinguishable. See notes 52 and 87 supra.
89. Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn. 2d 480, 486, 599 P.2d 1255, 1260 (1979); Sigman v.
Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 915, 920, 425 P.2d 891, 895 (1967); Lantis v. Pfarr, 67 Wn. 2d
994, 995, 410 P.2d 900, 901 (1966). When it reviews disputed issues of fact, a Washington appellate
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Sigman, 70 Wn. 2d at 919,425 P.2d at
894.
90. In analyzing the scope of review, it is important to distinguish between questions of law and
factual determinations made as a matter of law. The former involve issues that are inherently legal.
Those issues are subject to full review by the appellate courts. Local 1296, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters
v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 161-62, 542 P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975). The latter are factual
issues resolved by the trial court solely because the issue was one about which reasonable men could
not differ. Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn. 2d 911, 913, 541 P.2d 365, 368 (1975). In reviewing a factual
determination made as a matter of law, the appellate court determines whether or not there was evi-
dence sufficient to create a reasonable difference of opinion. Levy v. North Am. Ins., 90 Wn. 2d 846,
851, 586 P.2d 845, 848 (1978); Wilber Dev. Corp. v. Les Rowland Constr., Inc., 83 Wn. 2d 871,
877, 523 P.2d 186, 189 (1974).
91. Local 1296, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 161-62, 542
P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975); Leschi Imp. Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 286-87,
525 P.2d 774, 785 (1974); Harrison v. Consol. Holding Co., 200 Wash. 434,441, 93 P.2d 729, 732
(1939). As the supreme court stated in Leschi, 84 Wn. 2d at 286, 525 P.2d at 785: "Concerning
conclusions of state law this court is the final arbiter, and conclusions of state law entered by an
administrative agency or court below are not binding on this court .. "
92. Since the abolition of the distinction between law and equity, the supreme court has utilized
the same scope of review for both law and equity cases. Haire v. Patterson, 63 Wn. 2d 282, 286, 386
P.2d 953, 955-56 (1963); Detjen v. Detjen, 40 Wn. 2d 479, 483, 244 P.2d 238, 240 (1952). Prior to
the abolition of this distinction in 1951, equitable matters were tried de novo on appeal. Hubbell v.
Ward, 40 Wn. 2d 779, 781, 246 P.2d 468, 469 (1952).
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so easily resolved. Before an appellate court can choose between the two
standards of review, the proposition before it must be correctly desig-
nated as either a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. Incorrect designa-
tion by the trial court is only a minor problem. Washington's appellate
courts review the trial court's designation of findings and conclusions, 93
and serve as the final arbiters as to how a proposition should be denomi-
nated. 94 Conclusions of law, wrongly designated as findings of fact, will
be reviewed as questions of law. 95 Findings of fact, even if incorrectly
designated, will not be reversed if they are supported by substantial evi-
dence. 9
6
The major problem is a substantive one. The Washington courts have
not developed a general formula or test for distinguishing between find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. In fact, Washington's courts have not
even addressed the conceptual difficulties inherent in designating findings
and conclusions. 97 The existence of issues that are not wholly factual or
legal further complicates the courts' task. While Washington's appellate
courts have recognized the existence of these mixed questions of fact and
law, they have not dealt with this hybrid determination in a systematic
way.98
The formulation of one general test for distinguishing between findings
93. Local 1296, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 162, 542 P.2d
1252, 1256 (1975); Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn. 2d 561, 567, 383 P.2d 900, 904 (1963).
94. Local 1296, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 162, 542 P.2d
1252, 1256 (1975); Lehmann v. Board of Trustees of Whitman College, 89 Wn. 2d 874, 878, 576
P.2d 397, 399 (1978); Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 85 Wn. 2d 78, 82-83, 53"0 P.2d 298,
301 (1975).
95. Local 1296, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 161-62, 542
P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975).
96. Hoke v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 60 Wn. 2d 775,778, 375 P.2d 743,745-46 (1962).
97. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 548, 552-53, 599 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1979);
Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 353, 367, 588 P.2d 1334, 1343
(1979); Local 1296, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 161-62, 542
P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975).
98. The supreme court's consideration of mixed questions of fact and law has been result-ori-
ented and inconsistent. The court has employed meaningless jargon rather than analysis. In Wilson v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 85 Wn. 2d 78, 530 P.2d 298 (1975), the court reviewed a determination
designated by the trial court as a finding of fact. The supreme court held that the finding was fully
reviewable since it was a mixed question of fact and law "approximating" a conclusion of law. Id. at
82-83, 530 P.2d at 301.
In Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn. 2d 561, 383 P.2d 900 (1963), the court reviewed a determination
designated by the trial court as a conclusion of law. The court held that a conclusion that "partakes"
of the "nature" of a finding of fact should be reviewed as a finding, and employed the "substantial
evidence" standard. Id. at 567, 383 P.2d at 904. Similarly, in Lehmann v. Board of Trustees of
Whitman College, 89 Wn. 2d 874, 576 P.2d 397 (1978), the court held that a conclusion of law was a
mixed determination of fact and law. Since that conclusion "implie[d]" a factual determination
"sufficient" to treat it as a mixed issue, the conclusion was reviewed under the "substantial evi-
dence" standard. Id. at 878, 576 P.2d at 399.
In Hanson v. Lee, 3 Wn. App. 461, 466, 476 P.2d 550, 554 (1970), the court of appeals deter-
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and conclusions in all non-jury cases may not be possible. 99 The develop-
ment of a single, fixed standard of review for mixed findings and conclu-
sions would be even more difficult. The Washington courts could, how-
ever, establish specific standards of review for many of the different
substantive issues they review.
Such standards could and should be established for claims involving
the doctrine of disregard. Recent decisions applying the doctrine high-
light the need for an analytical approach. In Culinary Workers Local 596
v. Gateway Cafe, Inc. 100 and Morgan v. Burks, 101 the supreme court re-
viewed as questions of law both the characterization of shareholder ac-
tivity and the ultimate decision to disregard. The court adopted the oppo-
site approach in Grayson v. Nordic Construction Co. 10 2 In that case, the
trial court made "findings of fact" in which it both characterized the cor-
mined that a conclusion of law contained "subject matter sufficiently factual in nature to be treated as
a finding." When confronted with a finding of fact in In re Clark, 26 Wn. App. 832, 835, 611 P.2d
1343, 1344 (1980), the court held that the finding was "at least partly" a conclusion of law and
should, therefore, be reviewed as a conclusion of law.
99. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has formulated a general test for
distinguishing between findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d
104, 115 (9th Cir. 1962), the court set out the following two formulae: "A finding of fact, to which
the clearly erroneous rule applies [as contrasted with Washington's "substantial evidence" stan-
dard], is a finding based on the "fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct." A conclusion of law would be a conclusion based on application of a legal standard."
At least two commentators have characterized this test as being unworkable. Weiner offers the
following analysis of the Lundgren test:
The Lundgren test for distinguishing law from fact for Rule 52(a) purposes is unworkable. Its
deficiencies are apparent when the test is applied to the question whether undisputed facts should
be characterized as negligence. Such a determination would be "based on . . . experience
with the mainsprings of human conduct." But it would equally be "based on application of a
legal standard," the reasonably prudent man concept.
Subsequent Ninth Circut decisions show that the inadequacy of the Lundgren bifurcation is
not limited to cases concerning the reasonableness of given conduct.
Weiner, The Civil NonJury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1020, 1054 (1967)
(emphasis added).
That same criticism is set out in Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on
Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 530-31 (1963):
The [Lundgren] court's reasoning . . . requires close examination ...
Doubtless a finding is a conclusion of law if based "solely" on the application of legal stan-
dards. But, can it reasonably be said that a trial judge relies on his "experience with human
affairs" to the exclusion of the application of any legal standards in deriving a factual inference,
such as mutual mistake, from undisputed evidence? On the contrary, as pointed out in the
Galena Oaks discussion, every finding of ultimate fact involves some degree of legal reasoning.
The question thus becomes, as in Cordovan and Galena Oaks, at what point does the use of the
legal standard so predominate the finding that it becomes a conclusion of law? A further perti-
nent inquiry is whether such a test is really workable in this context.
A proper answer to these problems cannot be arrived at by oversimplification-any solution
must be one of degree, recognizing traditional precepts.
100. 91 Wn. 2d 353, 367, 588 P.2d 1334, 1343 (1979).
101. 93Wn.2d580,585-90,611 P.2d751,755-58(1980).
102. 92 Wn. 2d 548,599 P.2d 1271 (1979).
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poration's activities and concluded that, under the circumstances, the cor-
poration and its president were "alter egos." 103 On review, the supreme
court adopted the trial court's "finding of fact" designation and utilized
tfie "substantial evidence" standard in reviewing those determina-
tions. 10 4
Missing from the Washington courts' analysis is a clear consideration
of the four different determinations that should be made by the trial court
in cases involving the doctrine. It is this failure that has produced such
imprecise standards for appellate review. In fact, the doctrine's processes
are readily identifiable. In properly resolving a claim involving the doc-
trine of disregard, the trial court must accomplish the following:105
1. Make factual determinations as to what corporate and share-
holder activities actually occurred;1
06
2. Evaluate shareholder activity and characterize that conduct as
being either permissible or a misuse of the corporate form;
10 7
3. Determine whether, and to what extent, any abuse of the corpo-
rate form was a proximate cause of harm to the person asserting the
doctrine of disregard;
103. Id. at 551-52, 599 P.2d at 1273. Although neither the language in the trial court's finding
nor the supreme court's analysis so indicate, the trial court proceeded as if the ultimate decision as to
whether or not to disregard was automatic once the corporation and president were characterized as
alter egos. In fact, even where shareholder misconduct warrants the "alter ego" characterization, the
trial court must still determine whether that misconduct was a proximate cause of harm. See note 83
supea and notes 108-09, 118-24 and accompanying text infra.
104. Id. at 553, 599 P.2d at 1274. See also Truckweld Equip. Co. v. Olson, 26 Wn. App. 638,
643-46, - P.2d - , - (1980).
105. The functions performed by the court are listed in the logical order in which they should be
approached.
106. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra and note 111 infra. In taking evidence and
resolving factual disputes, the trial court may enter findings as to the subjective motivations of the
shareholders.
107. The supreme court has not expressly referred to this determination as one involving a
"characterization" process. See note 110 infra. In any case, this analysis must necessarily be under-
taken in considering the first element of the court's conjunctive test. See notes 26-27 and accompa-
nying text supra.
The subjective intent of the shareholders or others accused of misusing the corporation will un-
doubtedly influence the trial court's characterization of their conduct. Application of the doctrine,
however, is not dependent upon a determination that the shareholders had a subjective intention to
miisuse the corporation. The trial court will primarily concern itself with the shareholders' manifest
conduct. As Justice Horowitz recognized in Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations, 15
WASH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1940), the trial court will employ an objective analysis in characterizing share-
holder conduct: "It will be remembered that the formation, control and manipulation of separate
entities is intentional in character. The word 'intentional' is not used to mean secret, uncommuni-
cated intent but rather intent as manifested by outward act or conduct-overt intent."
The supreme court has expressly adopted this test. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 586-87, 611
P.2d 751, 756-57 (1980); J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64 Wn. 2d 470, 475, 392 P.2d 215, 218
(1964). The entire characterization process is nothing more than Justice Horowitz' search for "overt
intent."
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a. Determine whether shareholder misconduct was a cause-in-
fact of harm to the party seeking relief; 108
b. When shareholder misconduct is a cause-in-fact of damage,
after weighing mixed legal considerations, determine whether per-
sonal legal liability should be affixed upon the wrongdoing share-
holders;109
4. When misuse of the corporate form has proximately harmed a
person entitled to assert the doctrine, create a remedy broad enough
to right the wrong suffered by that person. 110
In selecting the proper standard of review, each of the trial court's four
determinations should be independently considered. The first determina-
tion is inherently factual. "' Washington's appellate courts have consis-
tently recognized that they will not retry factual disputes concerning what
corporations and their shareholders allegedly thought or did.' 1 2 Such de-
terminations will not be disturbed when they are based upon substantial
evidence."13
After the trial court has resolved factual disputes as to what occurred, it
must evaluate the shareholders' actions and characterize them as being
either permissible activities or an abuse of the corporate form. This sec-
ond determination is a mixed question of fact and law involving an appli-
cation of legal principles to the underlying factual determinations already
made by the trial court.
The legal component of the second determination is substantial. These
legal principles, incrementally formulated by the supreme court,"14 are
108. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 587-88, 611 P.2d 751, 756-57 (1980): King v. City of
Seattle, 84 Wn. 2d 239, 249-50, 525 P.2d 228, 234-35 (1974).
109. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn. 2d 239, 249-50, 525 P.2d 228, 234-35 (1974).
110. The conjunctive test formulated by the supreme court impliedly calls for the performance of
these four functions. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra. The general wording in the
court's formula, however, does not expressly describe the mechanics of how issues involving the
doctrine of disregard should be litigated or reviewed.
111. In Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 586-87, 611 P.2d 751, 756 (1980), the court recog-
nized the factual nature of these determinations: "Those cases set out the standard used by the court
in making the factual determinations of the parties' intent with regard to the corporate entity."
The supreme court "standard" referred to by Justice Horowitz in Morgan v. Burks is not "'ap-
plied" to factual determinations. That standard merely alerts the trial court to the factual matters that
bear upon the issue. Applying substantive legal principles to characterize these factual findings is a
second and conceptually distinct judicial function. For an analysis of that process, see notes 114-16
and accompanying text infra.
112. Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn. 2d 561, 568, 383 P.2d 900, 905 (1963): Thomdyke v. Hesper-
ian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn. 2d 570, 575, 343 P.2d 183, 186 (1959).
113. See note 89 supra.
114. Washington's adversary system precludes its courts from addressing issues that are not be-
fore the court. State v. Durham, 39 Wn. 2d 781, 784, 238 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1951); State exrel. N.Y.
Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Wn. 2d 834, 840, 199 P.2d 581, 585 (1948). Consequently, the
Washington courts have not rendered an appellate decision setting out a binding compendium of legal
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the foundation for the trial court's characterization of the shareholders'
activities. When such a mixed determination is founded on an erroneous
legal concept, it cannot be sustained. 115 Consequently, determinations in-
volving the evaluation and characterization of corporate activities should
be reviewed as questions of law.
116
Both the trial court's first and second determinations are subsumed
within the first element of the supreme court's two-part formula. 117 The
third determination, deciding whether shareholder misconduct was a
proximate cause of harm, u 8 involves the second element 119 of the con-
principles applicable to the characterization process. Those principles, however, are scattered
throughout the supreme court cases involving the doctrine of disregard. The following propositions
are examples of the legal principles guiding and limiting the trial court's evaluation and characteriza-
tion of shareholder activities:
1. The separate existence of a corporation will not be disregarded solely because its assets
are not sufficient to discharge its obligations. Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wn. 2d 580, 589, 611 P.2d
751, 757 (1980); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400, 406, 562
P.2d 244, 247 (1977).
2. Shareholders can legitimately use the corporate form as a means of limiting their liability.
Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 353, 366, 588 P.2d 1334, 1343
(1979); Bums v. Norwesco Marine, Inc., 13 Wn. App. 414, 418, 535 P.2d 860, 862-63
(1975).
3. Deliberate attempts to use the corporate form for the frustration of particular obligations
will not be permitted. Culinary Workers Local 596, 91 Wn. 2d at 366, 588 P.2d at 1343.
4. Sham corporations, inadequately capitalized and set up with the intent of defrauding all
creditors, or a class of creditors, will be disregarded. Allman Hubble Tugboat Co. v. Reliance
Dev. Corp., 193 Wash. 234,237-39, 74 P.2d 985, 986-87 (1938).
5. Gutting or otherwise misappropriating a corporation's assets will never be permitted.
Morgan, 93 Wn. 2d at 584-85, 611 P.2d at 754-55; Harrison v. Puga, 4 Wn. App. 52, 64, 480
P.2d 247,255 (1971).
6. A subsidiary corporation is not abused simply because a parent corporation owns all or
most of the subsidiary's stock, the parent corporation loaned money to the subsidiary, and each
company has the same president, general manager and trustees. Sommer v. Yakima Motor
Coach Co., 174 Wash. 638,649-59, 26 P.2d 92, 96-100 (1933).
7. It is not improper for all of the stock of a close corporation to be owned by members of a
single family or by one person. Grayson v. Nordic Constr. Co., 92 Wn. 2d 548, 553, 599 P.2d
1271, 1274 (1979); State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn. 2d 1, 41, 182 P.2d 643, 664
(1947).
8. In evaluating and characterizing shareholder conduct after it has considered the entirety
of each shareholder's activities, the trial court should determine whether those activities are
consistent with honesty and fair dealing. Sommer, 174 Wash. at 653, 26 P.2d at 97.
Other examples of corporate abuse, listed by the California courts and in the Horowitz article, are
set out in note 38 supra.
115. Local 1296, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 162, 542
P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975); Harrison v. Consol. Holding Co., 200 Wash. 434, 441, 93.P.2d 729, 732
(1939).
116. See Weiner, supra note 99, at 1056.
117. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
118. Id. The supreme court's language prohibiting conduct that would "aid the consummation of
a fraud or wrong upon others" is nothing more than a statement of the proximate cause requirement.
See Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash. 152, 157, 74 P.2d 990, 992 (1938).
119. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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junctive formula. This determination is a complex one. As the supreme
court recognized in King v. City of Seattle, 120 the proximate cause issue
involves mixed questions of fact and law. 121 The legal component of that
issue involves the ultimate question of whether legal liability should at-
tach. 12
2
When it has expressly discussed the scope of its review, the supreme
120. 84 Wn. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
121. In discussing this issue, the court said the following:
The City's actions here were a cause in fact of the plaintiffs' damages, and the amount of
damages is not disputed....
This is the sense in which the term "proximate cause" is often discussed. See WPI 15.01.
Cause in fact is not, however, the sole determinate [sic] of proximate cause, and in a broader
sense the question of law as to whether legal liability should attach, given cause in fact, is the
question still before us in this case ...
As a matter of policy we cannot say on these facts that the defendant City should be legally
liable for the plaintiffs' loss. Conceding all the other elements of tort liability are present, they
are not sufficient in themselves to make out a prima facie case. The court still must adduce from
the record whether, as a policy of law, legal liability should attach to the defendent if the other
factual elements are proven and no affirmative defense is made out. "[Clausation, as such, is a
question of fact. Proximate causation is a question of law. The entire doctrine [of proximate
cause] assumes that a defendant is not necessarily to be held responsible for all the consequences
of his acts." McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 155 (1925).
The trial court in finding of fact No. 9 determined that the City's acts were "a proximate
cause" of the plaintiffs' damages. We treat this finding as a conclusion of law, its proper desig-
nation, subject to the review of this court as a question of law. See L. Green, Rationale of
Proximate Cause, ch. I §§ 3-4 (1927); 1 T. Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 1 10 (1906);
Terry, Proximate Consequences in the Law of Torts, 28 HARV. L. REV. 10, 24 (1914).
The standards which a court must apply to a tort action in determining whether legal liability
should attach to the defendant if the factual elements of the tort are proven, are not susceptible of
a conclusive and fixed set of rules, readily formulated. "[L]egal liability is always to be deter-
mined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice,
policy, and precedent.... The best use that can be made of the authorities on proximate cause is
merely to furnish illustrations of situations which judicious men upon careful consideration have
adjudged to be on one side of the line or the other." I T. Street, Foundations of Legal Liability,
110(1906).
King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn. 2d 239, 249-50, 525 P.2d 228, 234-35 (1974) (emphasis added).
In cases involving the doctrine of disregard, the status of the person invoking the doctrine is an
important aspect of the proximate cause determinatiPn. Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash. 152,
156-57, 74 P.2d 990, 992 (1938); see also notes 13-20 and accompanying text supra.
The supreme court has often recited the maxim that the issue of proximate cause is a question of
fact to be resolved by the jury. Boeing v. State, 89 Wn. 2d 443, 449, 572 P.2d 8, 12 (1978); Moyer
v. Clark, 75 Wn. 2d 800, 804, 454 P.2d 374, 376 (1969). That maxim is entirely consistent with the
rule that in non-jury cases the issue of proximate cause should be reviewed as a conclusion of law.
The proximate cause issue is a mixed question of fact and law irrespective of whether it arises in a
jury or non-jury case. In a jury case, the trial court resolves the legal aspects of the question before
the jury makes the ultimate determination as to whether proximate causation exists. Before submit-
ting the issue to a jury, the trial court determines that, as a policy of law, liability may properly be
affixed in that case. After making that determination, a routine decision in many types of cases, the
court also provides the jury with an instruction on the law governing its consideration of the proxi-
mate cause issue.
122. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn. 2d 239, 249-50, 525 P.2d 228, 234-35 (1974).
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court has held that a determination involving the proximate cause issue
should be characterized as a conclusion of law fully reviewable by the
appellate courts as a question of law. 123 In practice, however, Washing-
ton's appellate courts have utilized a different standard of review for each
of the two components of the proximate cause issue. The cause-in-fact
component of the proximate cause issue has been reviewed as a finding of
fact. The trial court's determination as to whether legal liability should
attach has been reviewed as a question of law. 124
In a case in which it disregards a corporation's separate existence, the
trial court must select an appropriate remedy. 125 Unlike the standards for
123. Id. See also Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 85 Wn. 2d 78, 82-83, 530 P.2d 298,
301 (1975). In Culinary Workers Local 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 353, 588 P.2d 1334
(1979), botli the trial court and the supreme court resolved these mixed considerations in a rather
cryptic manner. The court merely determined that the factual situation in that case was one where it
was "appropriate" to disregard the corporate entity and affix personal liability against the wrongdo-
ing shareholders. Id. at 367, 588 P.2d at 1343.
124. The supreme court's own analysis in King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn. 2d 239, 249-50, 525
P.2d 228, 234-35 (1974), demonstrates that the two components of the proximate cause issue can be
conceptually segregated from each other. The cause-in-fact component of the proximate cause issue
is a factual matter. That component can be practicably distinguished from the mixed legal considera-
tions evaluated by the trial court in determining whether legal liability should attach. See note 121
supra.
In fact, Washington's appellate courts review non-jury determinations of causation-in-fact as
factual findings. The "substantial evidence" standard of review is routinely applied to determina-
tions designated as "findings of fact" if (1) those determinations are limited solely to disputes involv-
ing factual causation, and (2) the trial court separately states, in a determination designated as a
'conclusion of law," whether proximate causation exists. The application of a different standard for
reviewing each component of the proximate cause issue is consistent with the principle that, with
respect to disputed issues of fact, Washington's appellate courts will not substitute their judgment for
that of the trial court. See note 89 supra.
The supreme court has, itself, impliedly adopted a separate standard for each component. Al-
though the court did not directly address this issue in King v. City of Seattle, it did not review Finding
of Fact No. 8, the trial court's determination as to factual causation, as a question of law. King v.
City of Seattle, 84 Wn. 2d 239, 242, 249-50, 525 P.2d 228, 231, 234-35 (1974). The supreme court
accepted the trial court's factual determination that the city's acts prevented the plaintiff from con-
structing an office building. In considering the proximate cause issue, the supreme court reviewed
only the ultimate issue as to whether legal liability should attach, as a question of law.
125. The remedies available to the trial judge include the following:
1. Determining that a shareholder or other entity has a duty to perform an obligation in-
curred by the corporation. Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., 33 Wn.
2d 169, 205 P.2d 597 (1949); State ex rel. Tacoma v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 61 Wash. 507,
112 P. 506 (1911). See also note 10 supra;
2. Enjoining the transfer of assets from a corporation to its shareholders. Morgan v. Burks,
93 Wn. 2d 580, 611 P.2d 751 (1980);
3. Mandating that a shareholder return property or perform some other act. McCurdy v.
Spokane Western Power & Traction Co., 174 Wash. 470, 497, 24 P.2d 1075, 1083-84 (1933);
State ex rel. Tacoma v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 61 Wash. 507, 112 P. 506 (1911);
4. Refusing, as a result of the plaintiff's actions, to recognize a traditional limitation on the
assertion of an affirmative defense. J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 64 Wn. 2d 470, 478, 392
P.2d 215,220 (1964);
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the other three determinations, the choice of the proper standard for the
fourth determination is not based upon the law-fact distinction. Washing-
ton's appellate courts have afforded trial judges considerable discretion in
the selection of remedies. 1
26
VII. CONCLUSION
Consistent with its equitable origins, the doctrine of disregard is en-
cumbered by few rigid jurisprudential concepts. As a result, Washing-
ton's courts have substantial flexibility in remedying corporate miscon-
duct. Any further substantive doctrinal development would be counter-
productive. Litigants would benefit, however, both from a definitive
holding on the jury trial issue and from an express formulation of rules
governing the appellate review of cases involving the doctrine.
5. Setting aside contractual obligations or entitlements. Morgan, 93 Wn. 2d at 588-89, 611
P.2d at 757;
6. Awarding money damages to the injured party. Sommer v. Yakima Motor Coach Co.,
174 Wash. 638, 648-49, 26 P.2d 92, 96 (1933); Peterick v. State, 22 Wn. App. 163, 167. 589
P.2d 250, 255 (1970); see also notes 64-85 and accompanying text supra.
126. This inherent discretionary power exists in any equitable proceeding in which a trial court is
fashioning a remedy after having correctly resolved the liability issue. Questions of law will be fully
reviewed by the appellate courts in both legal and equitable proceedings. See note 92 supra.
In Coy v. Raabe, 77 Wn. 2d 322, 326, 462 P.2d 214, 216 (1966), the court recognized the trial
court's discretionary power to select an appropriate remedy: "In any equitable proceeding, the trial
court has certain inherent discretion which can be exercised." See also Ford v. County Dist. Board of
Health, 16 Wn. App. 709, 558 P.2d 821 (1977). In Tradewell Stores v. T.B. & M., Inc.. 7 Wn.
App. 424, 428, 500 P.2d 1290, 1293 (1972), the court of appeals, citing Coy v. Raabe, held that it
was "required" to give "great weight" to the trial court's inherent discretion in granting relief in an
equitable proceeding. Cf. McCurdy v. Spokane Western Power & Traction Co., 174 Wash. 470.
497, 24 P.2d 1075, 1083-84 (1973) (without discussing the scope of its review, the court implied in
obiter dictum that it would closely review the remedy selection process in cases involving the doc-
trine of disregard).
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